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Shin Buddhist Ethics in Our Postmodern Age 
of Mappd
THOM AS P. KASULIS
IN the past few years, I have been reflecting on Shinran's understanding of mappd 末法 and its helpfulness to thinking through the implications of our 
own Zeitgeist called postmodemity.1 In this paper, we will explore how
* This paper is based on a lecture given at Otani University on November 5 ,1999 .1 would 
like to thank Otani University and its Academic Exchange Program for hosting me as a visit­
ing profossor in both autumn 1997 and autumn 1999, and for giving me the opportunity to 
teach a graduate seminar as well as to give two public lectures. Many ideas in this paper were 
refined through my conversations with the University's faculty and students during those vis­
its.
1 It is often important to distinguish postmodemity (a description of our present social sit­
uation) from postmodernism (a theory that recognizes, analyzes, and offers a reasoned 
response to that situation). The same distinction would apply to the twin terms "modernity'' 
and "modemism.^^ In this paper, I often find it helpful to speak of a "postmodern (or modem) 
consciousness/' suggesting an awareness of the postmodern situation that permeates one's 
judgments about fact and value. ''Postmodern consciousness" is, therefore, a sensitivity to and 
interpretation of our current situation in light of certain categories. As a form of conscious­
ness, however, it also involves a reflexivity that allows the possibility for reflecting on that sit­
uation, of thinking about it as well as through it, perhaps even undermining it in some way. In 
juxtaposing such a postmodern consciousness with Shinran's m6!/2/2O-consciousness, we will 
find many of Shinran's points to be a response to our postmodemity as well as to his mappd.
I hesitate, however, to call Shinran's theory a '"postmodernism" for two reasons. First, 
although his analysis of his own situation parallels in many ways the analyses of many post­
modernist thinkers, his conclusions are radically unlike those of most, if not all, Western post­
modern theorists. That is, one could reject all present Western postmodernist theories and still 
accept Shinran. Second, it has become fashionable for Western postmodernist critics to appro­
priate many traditional Buddhist and Daoist thinkers into their hegemonic, Eurocentric field.
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Shinran?s ideas can be especially pertinent to some ethical predicaments 
symptomatic of postmodemity. Before turning to that particular topic, how­
ever, it is useful to review some main reasons why I think it ftnitful to com­
pare mappd and postmodemity in the first place.2 Given the differences in 
their intellectual and cultural contexts, their similarities are not necessarily 
self-evident. If we turn away from their historical development and look 
instead at how they characterize the human predicament, however, the paral­
lels become more apparent. Let us start with what we mean in this paper by 
“postmodern consciousness.^^ The term has multiple nuances and it is not 
surprising that different disciplines such as aesthetics, literary criticism, 
social theory, politics, and philosophy have their own understandings. In our 
use of the term, it is worth noting initially the prefix: post-modern. A previ­
ous worldview, or way of life, or set of common values is no longer opera­
tive. To understand the postmodern, therefore, we need to understand what it 
left behind, namely, the "modern."
"Modernism'' itself has multiple meanings, but what most interests us 
here is its philosophical and social relevance. Philosophically, modernism 
was a movement in Western thought beginning with such early 17th-century 
thinkers as Descartes, Hobbes, and Galileo. It represents a way of thinking 
that turned from biblical and ecclesiastical authority to place its emphasis on 
what could be known through empirical observation and logical reasoning. 
This gave birth to a new faith: a trust in science, secular education, and re­
search. Modernism assumes the world is fully knowable and that humanity 
can achieve a systematic, comprehensive understanding o f it. Socially, mod­
ernism led to the establishment of a new elite. The experts in premodem 
society were the scholars who studied the ancient religious classics, whereas 
the experts of the modem period were those with developed knowledge of 
empirical science, mathematics, and technology. As philosophical modern­
ism evolved into the nineteenth century, those with expert, scientific knowl­
edge (in German, Wis sens chaff) played a central role in defining society and
In this paper, if anything, I am trying to reverse that trend by privileging the Asian over the 
Eurocentric, specifically, by interpreting postmodern consciousness as a form of mappo-con- 
sciousness, rather than vice versa. When we do that, we may find a way out of some of our 
postmodern dilemmas, especially those related to axiological issues.
2 The first time I publicly discussed this issue was in my 1997 lecture at Otani, "Shin 
Buddhist Philosophy for a Postmodern Society.5, Some points in this discussion draw direct­
ly from there. Again, I would like to thank the faculty and students of Otani University for 
their insightful comments on that lecture.
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setting its agenda. What began as a movement to analyze the natural world in 
terms of reason and observation expanded to the development o f the so- 
called social "sciences" of sociology, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, 
economics, and political science. History became increasingly the chronolo­
gy of human events arranged in a direct causal sequence that should be 
understood without resort to any nonempirical facts.
In the W esfs social upheavals of the late 1960s, many became skeptical of 
the optimism behind modernism's project and by the end of the 1970s, the 
terms "postmodernism" and ccpostmodemity" became accepted designations 
for important cultural and intellectual trends. In the era of nuclear and envi­
ronmental destruction, scientism—modernism's theory that science is not 
only a source of knowledge, but the only reliable basis for truth一has fallen 
into disrepute. Truth must go beyond mere positivistic facts and include axi・ 
ological questions. When global technological and economic development 
means the subjugation of most of humanity and the destruction o f the life­
sustaining environment, it can no longer be accepted naively or blindly. The 
postmodern mood is to scrutinize the fruits of modernism and when there is 
bad fruit, to question the soundness of its roots. Therefore, the postmodern 
rejects, or at the least questions, various modernist assumptions. For our pur­
poses, we will consider four.
Modem consciousness^ first assumption involved its understanding of 
authority. Although Western modernism broke away from the Church as the 
central authority in matters of knowledge, it still tended to think in terms of 
both a philosophically and socially authoritative center. That center was still 
defined as the dominion of the educated, but unlike the medieval period, the 
idea of education expanded to include, and eventually to emphasize, secular 
knowledge. Postmodern consciousness, on the other hand, advocates plural­
ism, rather than a hegemonic center. It seeks to enfranchise and recognize the 
voices of those excluded from modernism's center: the poor, the ethnic or 
racial minorities, the colonized, women, the handicapped, and so forth. Rath­
er than defining knowledge as rationality and empiricism, postmodernism 
finds insight in the unregimented engagement of all perspectives. Rather 
than giving dominance to one voice over the others, postmodernism tends to 
give each perspective its turn in a de-centered discourse that maintains dif­
ference without any attempt to resolve, dissolve, or transcend it.
Modem consciousness^ second assumption was its trust in objectivity. 
Modem scientism purports to take the subjective element out of experience 
and to leave us with the undistorting gaze of perfect detachment. It views
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knowledge as impartial, justice as blind, and numbers as trustworthy. Yet, 
the postmodern asks, who determines what is knowledge and what is empty 
belief, who regulates and enforces justice, and who decides what to measure? 
The topics of medical research are determined not by the supposed objectiv­
ity of numerical analysis, but by those who fund the research. Science may 
theoretically be interested in every thing, but scientists naturally look first at 
what is closest to themselves. For example, some of the greatest killers of 
human beings are tropical diseases, but because the centers of science are in 
the temperate zones, the etiology and possible cures for those diseases are lit­
tle studied (unless, like HIV, the disease moves into those technologically 
advanced countries). The postmodern consciousness, therefore, questions 
the very basis of such modernist claims to objectivity and impartiality. It 
contends that we see only what we look for and what we look for depends on 
our presuppositions and predilections, themselves influenced by the needs of 
our social class, nationality, gender, and political affiliations. In this post­
modern shift is a recognition that what we know depends on who we are.
This leads to a third difference between the modem and postmodern: the 
contrast between totality and fragmentation. When confronted with the mul­
tiplicity of viewpoints, each true to its own context, the modem saw those 
differences as complementary facets of a single truth. Consider the famous 
Indian story of the blind men and the elephant. Encountering an elephant for 
the first time, a group of blind men are asked to describe it. The first blind 
man had felt the elephant trunk and said the elephant must be something 
like a snake; another felt a leg and said the elephant must be like a tree trunk; 
a third the elephant?s tail and said the elephant must be like a whip. The m od­
ernist assumed that outside the particular perspectival experiences o f the in・ 
dividual blind men, there must be a single reality一the whole elephant. I f  the 
blind men could pool their empirical knowledge, they could get a compre­
hensive, coherent picture of the whole. The whole truth can be constructed 
out of the sum of the partial, perspectival truths. Postmodems disagree with 
that metaphor and its interpretation. For them, reality is not whole, but inher­
ently and irretrievably fragmented. It is as if  instead of feeling the elephant, 
the blind men were asked to imagine the physical attributes of a beautiful 
woman. From their personal experience and acculturated preferences, each 
would imagine a whole physical woman一length and texture of hair, scent of 
perfume, body shape, and so forth. Can we, the postmodern asks, find the 
"true" image of physical beauty by somehow melding the various blind 
men's views? Obviously not. Imagine an amalgamated woman with partly
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wavy, partly curly, and partly straight hair, wearing three differently scented 
perfumes, and having a fusion of three different body shapes. The principle 
of synthesis does not work in such cases. For the postmodern, the truth is 
always at least partially the knower's construct and it may be such that other 
constructions cannot enhance or complement it. No simple synthesis is pos・ 
sible. Whereas the modem could only understand truth in terms of a com­
plete, all-encompassing system, the postmodern insists on fragmentation and 
the impossibility of completeness.
The fourth difference between modem and postmodern consciousness lies 
in their respective emphases on control and deconstruction. The modems 
used the tools o f technology and science to control or manage the world. 
Postmodems, however, believe modernism's optimistic attempt to control 
the world has given birth to restrictive, oppressive authority structures en­
forcing only one vision of how the world should be. As science and technol­
ogy have grown more sophisticated, their need for huge capital resources to 
support research and development has also grown. Only a megacorporation 
or the state itself can garnish the capital necessary for further basic research 
and that research, according to the postmodern interpretation, will inevitably 
reflect the interests of a corporate, global capitalism or a particular state ide­
ology. The postmodern seeks to unmask and deconstruct such structures of 
power.
Let us now bring Shinran into our discussion. We find his connection with 
the postmodern consciousness in his focus on mappd. Mappd, like post­
modernity, has a historical dimension in that it comes after and abandons an 
earlier way of thinking and valuing, namely, the dharma of the correct and 
semblance periods {shdbd 正法 and zdbd 像法）. Fundamentally, the idea of 
mappd is that even though we still have the true teachings of Buddhism 
available to us, we can no longer either understand them or put them into 
practice in our own lives. In other words, our grasp of the truth about reality 
or even ourselves is unavoidably partial, incomplete, and inadequate. Even 
to the extent we understand those truths in some partial way, we fail to act on 
them and continue instead to enwrap ourselves in layers of delusion.
For Shinran, this meant that the authoritative institutions of the Heian 
worldview were no longer germane. At Enryaku-ji, the center of the Tendai 
establishment where Shinran had studied and practiced as a young man, they 
exhaustively taught all forms of knowledge, both exoteric and esoteric. 
Every monk had available an arsenal of practices to cut through M ara?s 
armies of delusion and to bring one face-to-face with reality as it is. The
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whole enterprise had had the social, economic, cultural, and political support 
of the Heian aristocracy. Yet, with all that insight and all that practice on the 
mountain, the world of Kamakura Japan in the valleys seemed to be falling 
apart. The government was the result of a military coup and decades of open 
warfare; there were widespread occurrences of disease and natural disasters; 
individuals turned inward for their own personal liberation but found them­
selves distracted and upset by internal conflicts as real and debilitating as 
what was happening in the external world. In that context, the Holy Path of 
Sages, the Tendai （and Shingon） promise of living in harmony with reality 
and with oneself, only exacerbated one's sense of not knowing what is real­
ly happening and what to do about it. This sense of both the world and one's 
self as being profoundly unintelligible and out-of-control is the essence of 
mappd consciousness. Let us briefly compare Shinran's reaction to it in 
terms of our discussion of the four characteristics of postmodern conscious­
ness.
First, we have seen that postmodems generally question whether there can 
ever be a legitimate center of authority. The late-Heian Tendai （like Shin­
gon） system shared many similarities with modernity's scientism. It claimed 
to be totalistic and comprehensive （en 円）and had a state-supported, central 
institution that could integrate diverse teachings and practices into a single 
authoritative curriculum of studies and rituals. Tendai studied sacred texts 
and doctrines from every Buddhist school as legitimate perspectives that 
partially or contextually reveal the truth.3 However, as in the case of the ele­
phant, only the person who had the overall synthesis {chit 中）could under­
stand and mediate both the unqualified pattern （kit 空）and the various 
provisional or perspectival standpoints （辰 仮 ）as parts of a single totality. 
Shinran found that Tendai system unintelligible, ineffective, and spiritually 
irrelevant. As hard as he tried, he could not grasp and put into practice the 
hegemonic Tendai system. He left it behind, first voluntarily and then by 
coercion when Honen and his disciples were exiled from the capital. Living 
among the ordinary people, Shinran did not seek to replace Tendai5s syste 
atic teachings and central organization with alternative ones of his own. His
3 From the exoteric standpoint, this perspectival way of thinking is found in Tendai5 s clas­
sification of the teachings （kydhan 教判）which claims that the efficacy of the teaching 
depends on the perspective and background of the audience. Esoterically, as in Kukai?s theo­
ry of the ten mindsets {jujushin 十住心、），teachings have their location in a larger mandala-like 
view of the totalistic whole, each mindset being true to its context, but unaware of its limita­
tions. Only the esoteric view transcends and orders such perspectives.
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experience in Kanto led him to think in terms of local, coordinated religious 
communities, rather than centralized institutions.
Second, as we have explained, the postmodern brings suspicion to all 
claims for impersonal objectivity and universality. Our knowledge of the 
world is always colored by the context of our knowing. Therefore, the at­
tempts to develop a totalistic system such as Tendai4 5s or Shingon5s assumes 
one can have the master map on which to plot the truths of the various per­
spectives. Shinran found such a comprehensive insight impossible, evidence 
that his era was not one of shobo or zobo, but mappo. For Shinran, in his 
most intense moment of entrusting himself to Amida, in his profound shinjin 
信心，he claimed that Amida "took his vow for me, Shinran, alone.5,4 The 
foundation of his spirituality was his own personal experience in his own 
conditioned context, not dependence on reasoned argument (Jaakarai はから 
い,"calculation" or "figuring") or empirical data. Shinran found his spiritu­
ality in his personal shinjin, not in Tendai's authoritative comprehensive­
ness.
4 "When I consider deeply the Vow of Amida, which arose from five kalpas of profound 
thought, I realize that it was entirely for the sake of myself alone!11 Tannisho Postscript, in 
Hirota et al. 1997 (hereafter CWS) I: 679.
5 “I have no idea whether the nembutsu is truly the seed for my being bom in the Pure Land
or whether it is the karmic act for which I must fall into hell. Should I have been deceived by
Master Honen and, saying the nembutsu, were to fall into hell, even then I would have no 
regrets.
The reason is, if I could attain Buddhahood by endeavoring in other practices, but said the
nembutsu and so fell into hell, then I would feel regret at having been deceived. But I am inca­
pable of any other practice, so hell is decidedly my abode whatever I do." (Tannishd, ch. 2
CWS I: 662).
Third, postmodemity assumes insight will always be fragmentary rather 
than holistic. We can never see the whole truth, but only what is available 
from our own specific context. Even that we see only dimly. Shinran ex­
pressed this point by denying he really knew something on his own. He could 
never present himself as an authority; he rejected the notion the he himself 
could have disciples. He insisted instead that he was only repeating what he 
had heard from others, especially Honen, because in his predicament, that is 
all he could claim to understand. He did not grant objective authority even to 
that一 he admits that following Honen5 *s teachings might condemn him to 
hel!一 but he had no alternative (he would go to hell anyway).5 * In that way, 
Shinran made no claim of universal truth: he did not try to prove his teach・ 
ings through reason, scriptural authority, or personal insight.
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Finally, by deconstructing fixed ideas and practices, postmodemity for­
goes m o dern ism attem p t to control reality. That parallels Shinran's relin­
quishing his own power （jiriki 自力）to open himself to the spontaneous and 
natural （jinen 自然）power of Amida5s Vow （tariki 他力）.Through his deft 
use of the yomikae technique, he deconstructed the traditional readings of 
Chinese Pure Land texts. He undermined the establishmenfs expectations 
by calling himself "G u toku"（愚禿,a slacker who cannot even follow a mo­
nastic rule as simple as keeping one's head properly shaven）, by taking a 
wife and identifying himself as neither monk nor layman, and by not build­
ing a comprehensive Shin Buddhist institution with a single central organi­
zation like Enryaku-ji, Koya-san, or even Eihei-ji bu ilt'by his Zen Buddhist 
contemporary, Dogen.
Bearing in mind those provocative similarities between Shinran5s mappd 
consciousness and our own postmodern consciousness, we can now inquire 
into how Shinran might be able to help us with one of the most disturbing 
problems for postmodemity一 ethics. Without established authority or uni­
versality, limited as one is to one's own particular situation, how can an cth・ 
ical position be formulated, and even more importantly, how can it be lived? 
That predicament is common to postmodemity and mappd. If  Shinran^ phi­
losophy can help us work through that perplexity, it would be particularly 
relevant to us today.
Before we go into Shinran^ view, a brief comment about the general 
Buddhist context of ethics is in order. In our philosophical discussions, we 
have several different understandings of ethics. One view is that ethics is 
about developing a list of behavioral dos and don^s, like the Ten Command­
ments of the Hebrew Bible. Other ethical positions address not so much spe­
cific behaviors, but attitudes behind the behavior. Jesus?s t4love thy neighbor 
as thyself" or the Japanese Seventeen-article Constitution's u be not envi­
ous" （Article 14） exemplify well that variety. For the most part, Buddhism 
does not emphasize ethics in either of those two senses, however. Even the 
moral precepts {sila） or the Bodhisattva Vows are not like the Ten Com­
mandments—external moral mandates from some source of authority一 but 
more like self-imposed restrictions on one's behavior. Consider this parallel. 
Suppose I vow to give up smoking. It is a real vow to which I am committed 
and which, if I follow through, will transform part of my life. Yet, that is not 
in itself an ethical vow; it stems more from practical wisdom about health 
than ethical norms. Similarly, the bodhisattva vows or precepts are meant to 
transform the way I live so I can be more healthy spiritually. The original
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Buddhist term applied to such precepts was not "moral'' or "good" but 
instead "skillful" (kusalci). In many respects, the Buddhist precepts and bod­
hisattva vows resemble psychotherapy as much as ethics. Both psychothera­
py and Buddhism address a negative psychic state {duhkha in Buddhism) and 
suggest ways of breaking the cycle of self-harming habits (cycles sometimes 
represented in Buddhism as the twelve negative links or nidanas or even the 
Wheel of Life). Psychotherapy and Buddhist precepts show us how to break 
out of those cycles, how to recondition ourselves so as not to be so psycho- 
spiritually self-destructive.
Because of its emphasis on developing the right habits, that aspect of 
Buddhism resembles some forms of Western virtue ethics. The classical idea 
of virtue ethics, which we find in Aristotle for example, is that proper train­
ing, proper formation of habit, will develop people of character who will 
spontaneously do the moral thing as circumstances require. As long as the 
student follows the steps taught by the mentor or the pedagogical system, the 
student will develop character and eventually even understand the point of 
the moral training. For some traditions of Buddhism, especially those with a 
guru structure, we find some significant similarities, but certainly such an 
understanding would not apply to any form of Buddhism that takes mappo 
seriously. In the age of mappo, there are no authoritative sages or mentors 
and the systems of the dharma cannot be understood.
This brings us to a final contrast between general Buddhist ethics and 
many forms of Western ethics. In the West because moral maxims or princi­
ples are understood to have a source beyond the individual, they are under­
stood to be equally applicable to every person. Therefore, I can morally 
judge others by the same criteria I judge myself. In fact, for many Western 
ethicists, I am not only entitled to judge the actions or motives of others in 
that way, but I also have a moral obligation to prevent others from acting 
immorally. If it would be immoral for me to treat people in a certain way, it 
is also immoral for society or the government to treat people in that way. 
Therefore, this sort of reasoning goes, it is my own moral responsibility to 
stand against society or the government if it acts in such an immoral manner. 
In contrast, the Buddhist tradition has not often so closely connected person­
al and social ethics. There have been important exceptions, of course. In 
India, Buddhism has traditionally stood up against the injustices and unfair­
ness of the caste system, for example. Today in Southeast Asia and other 
parts of the Buddhist world, so-called "engaged Buddhism" calls for social 
justice as a demand arising from the Buddhist Dharma itself. Despite such
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examples, it is fair to say that Buddhists have more often than not interpret­
ed precepts and vows to be an internal exercise in removing the roots of 
one's own delusions, rather than changing the conditions of society. In that 
respect, Buddhism is quite different from most Western ethical systems.
Let us now turn our attention to the specific case of Shin Buddhism. This 
takes us into one of the most complex areas of Shinran's thought. In fact, if 
we take a superficial reading of Shinran5s position, we might conclude that 
Shin Buddhism has nothing distinctive whatsoever to contribute to our 
understanding of ethics. There are three reasons for such an interpretation. 
First, discussions of Shin ethics inevitably cite Shinran's famous line from 
Tannishd chapter 3: "Even a good person can be reborn in the Pure Land; 
how much more so an evil one." That might be taken to mean that "an ethi­
cal Shin Buddhist5J is an oxymoron. Second, because of their traditional 
suspicion about universal claims一their unwillingness to proclaim an au­
thoritatively single truth to the misguided or ignorant一Shin Buddhists find 
it difficult to develop a collective social or ethical position. If Shin Buddhism 
as an institution were to take a moral position, that might give the impression 
that the organizational structure has a legitimate center of authority, the kind 
of structure theoretically excluded by m(7/2/2d-consciousness. Third, because 
Shin Buddhism has no fixed set of moral precepts distinctive to its tradition, 
on ethical issues Shin might seem to be a generic Mahayana Buddhism. Yet, 
even taking the Mahayana Bodhisattva Vows is, on the surface at least, a 
kind of jiriki, a claim that one can do something meritorious by one's own 
efforts. Shinran is clear on this point: whatever good I might perform is not 
my own act, but rather the working of Amida's Vow.6 7 In that context, Shin 
Buddhism would seem to be the Mahayana tradition least likely to say some­
thing helpful about ethics.コ In short, it would seem that the more we move
6 The idea that the working of Amida's Vow is the source of all truly good and compas­
sionate action can be found in several places within Shinran^ works. Two examples are:
"[The] Second [way Amida directs his virtue to us] is Amida's directing of virtue for our 
return to this world. This is the benefit we receive, the state of benefiting and guiding others." 
(Passages on the Pure Land Way, CWS I: 301)
"To be made to become so" means that without the practiceds calculating in any way what­
soever, all that practicer's past, present, and future evil karma is transformed into the highest 
good. (Notes on "Essentials o f Faith Alone" CWS I: 453)
7 It should be noted, however, that East Asian Buddhist traditions in general have tradi­
tionally said little about social ethics. That is partly because East Asian Buddhism took root in 
cultures already deeply influenced by Confucian social and moral norms. In contrast to Indian 
Buddmsm's taking root in a Hindu caste culture that Buddhists felt the need to criticize, East
25
THE E A STER N  B U D D H IST X X X I I I ,1
from general Buddhist principles to specifically Shin Buddhist ones, the less 
clear the relevance to ethics. The danger is that Shin Buddhists might actual­
ly use their religion as an excuse for avoiding moral involvement in social 
ills. That is not at all what Shinran intended, however. Let us begin with a 
different interpretation of the above three points about Shin Buddhist ethics.
Let us start with Shinran's previously quoted statement about the prefer­
ence for the evil person's being reborn in the Pure Land. What exactly does 
he mean by the term akunin 悪人，〇］ "evil person" and the contrasting term 
“good person" or zennin 善人? Although doing good is not the means for 
birth in the Pure Land, Shinran explicitly states that a person should not per­
form evil in order to be saved by Ami da's Vow. That would be comparable, 
he says, to taking a poison just because we have an antidote.8 The way I gloss 
the passage in question is to substitute the English colloquialism tcdo-good- 
ers" for "good people" and interpret Shinran as saying “Even do-gooders 
may be bom in the Pure Land; how much more so those who are not." That 
is, I think Shinran is not talking about people in terms of an external standard 
of good and evil, but rather, is referring to the way people view themselves, 
their actions, and their capacities. Do-gooders are people who not only do 
good, but also think of their good deeds as part of their self-identity. They not 
only see their actions as good, but also they see themselves as intrinsically 
good and morally able to discern what is a for the good." Such a self-image 
would, Shinran believed, only entangle one further in jiriki, the idea that one 
can help oneself and others through one's own power. Shinran believed that 
the proper response to seeing one's actions as having led to something good 
is not pride, is not an increase in self-esteem, but rather gratitude. That 
something good was done is not my doing, but rather, it was the working of 
Amida's compassionate Vow.9 Viewed in light of this interpretation, Shin­
ran's message is very clear. If a person considers oneself a zennin, then that 
person may do good deeds, but will never realize the need for tariki, will 
never realize that it was not by one's own power that good was performed. 
Therefore, such a person does not ever experience pure shinjin. Yet, even that
Asian Buddhism did not find Confucianism so incompatible with Buddhist ideals. For a fuller 
discussion of that point, see my "Does East Asian Buddhism Have an Ethical System" in 
Journal o f Religious Philosophy (Kyoto: Zen Buddhism Today, 1990, pp. 41-60).
8 See Tannisho, section 13, CWS I: 671 and L amp for the L atter Ages, CWS I: 553.
9 For further discussion of the relation between one's own personal karmic evil and the 
transformation into good through the working of Amida's Vow, see the editors' comment on 
“evil" in their glossary, CWS I I :183-186.
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person is not completely excluded from the compassionate working of 
Amida?s Vow.10
Incidentally, this understanding of akunin and zennin in Shinran5s writing 
suggests a more general hermeneutic for interpreting Shinran5s thought. It is 
often helpful, especially in problematic passages, to bring a psychological or 
even phenomenological perspective to Shinran^ statements. We have noted 
already, for example, the importance of Shinran5s emphasis on mappo-co 
sciousness as a mode of experiencing and reflecting, rather than simply an 
idea in historical or metaphysical theory. In short, it is often more important 
in reading Shinran to see that he is analyzing how something is experienced 
rather than what it is as a fact of external reality. Speculating on the nature of 
reality itself is not a central focus in Shinran's work. Yet, he does engage in 
reflection on, and justification of, Shin praxis.11 There are at least two rea-
10 Shinran follows the Pure Land tradition in recognizing various "transformed lands” of 
paradise as well as the Pure Land itself. A discussion of those places is found in Chapter 6 of 
Kyogyoshinsho, (CWS I: 207 ffJ). On the connection between the "borderlands" and jiriki, see 
Hymn 67 of Jodo was an:
Those who, though aspiring for the Pure Land of happiness,
Do not realize shinjin that is Other Power,
Doubt the Buddha's inconceivable wisdom and therefore dwell
In the borderland or the realm of indolence and pride. (CWS I: 343)
11 This suggests that as a philosopher, Shinran is more focused on metapraxis than meta­
physics. That is, religiously, he is immersed in the praxis of Shin Buddhism, the nembutsu, for 
example. Yet, given his historical context, he must philosophically justify why that practice is 
superior to others and not just one of many complementary practices (the Tendai view). 
Furthermore, he must philosophically justify his own understanding of the nembutsu as dis­
tinguished from that of other Pure Land Buddhists, such as the followers of Honen in Jodo 
Buddhism. Such philosophical justification of a praxis vis-a-vis other praxes and their justifi­
cations is what I call "metapraxis.'' In formulating such a philosophical defense of one's own 
praxis, however, one will inevitably resort to some metaphysical claims about reality as sup­
port for one's claim of practical efficacy. That is, in explaining philosophically why my prax­
is works (and yours does not), I will assume certain things about the nature of reality at large. 
If I go beyond merely making those assumptions to trying to justify them, I then engage in 
religious metaphysics. For a fuller explanation of the relations among praxis, metapraxis, and 
metaphysics, see my '"Philosophy as Metapraxis" in Frank Reynolds and David Tracy (eds.), 
Discourse and Praxis (Albany: SUNY, 1992, p p .169-96).
Therefore, it is not surprising that although Shinran is not primarily interested in meta­
physics, he must occasionally engage in it, nonetheless. When he does so, moreover, we must 
pay careful attention to what he says since it will be a critical underpinning of his entire reli­
gious philosophy and an intrinsic part of the justification for his religious way of life. Such a 
rare metaphysical passage, one to which we will allude in the conclusion of this paper, is from 
Yuishinshd mon 'i 唯信抄文意:
27
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H IS T  X X X I I I , 1
sons for this: one derived from the larger Kamakura period Zeitgeist and one 
from the particular context of the Pure Land tradition.
For some time, scholars have pointed out that there is something u existen- 
tial?, or "personal" in much of Kamakura religious thought. In a world in 
which the social order was dissolving, in which the possibility of explaining 
everything via a single comprehensive system一 either esoteric or exoteric— 
was being called into question, a time when institutionalized religion had 
limited contact with ordinary people, it was natural that the religious impulse 
would turn inward. The religious question had shifted from "how do I fit into 
the cosmos?" to "how can I find spiritual harmony within m yself?" Al­
though that Kamakura Zeitgeist was operative in Shmran's thinking, proba­
bly more important was the Shin Buddhist context itself and its central ideas. 
If  the Holy Path of the Sages were really a viable alternative, he could throw 
himself into its practices. That is, for example, what the 乙en master, Dogen, 
tried to do. Yet, ShinranJs deep sense of mappd convinced him that such a 
plan could never work for him. So he entrusted himself completely to the 
exemplar of his mentor, Honen, and in so doing, entrusted himself to the 
working of Amida's Vow. In short, Shinran's awareness of mappd was not 
the result of his calculating the number of centuries that had passed since the 
Buddha. Rather, it derived from his own self-reflection and the awareness of 
his own limitations.
Because of Shinran5s distance from us in time and social context, it is hard 
to be anything but scholars as we read him. We want to know the texts he 
was using, the historical sources of his ideas, the subtle philological conn〇・ 
tations of his terminology. That is all fine, but we must not forget to look 
inward into our selves as well. That is why it is important to stress how our 
own postmodern consciousness is like Shinran^ m6z/7/?d-consciousness. The 
more we confront in our own lives the signposts of the postmodern
Since it is with this heart and mind of all sentient beings that they entrust themselves to 
the Vow of the dharma-body as compassionate means, this shinjin is none other than 
Buddha-nature. This Buddha-nature is dharma-nature. Dharma-nature is dharma-body. For 
this reason there are two kinds of dharma-body with regard to the Buddha. The first is 
called dharma-body as suchness and the second, dharma-body as compassionate means. 
Dharma-body as suchness has neither color nor form; thus, the mind cannot grasp it nor 
words describe it. From this oneness was manifested form, called dharma-body as compas­
sionate means.
Taking this form, the Buddha announced the name Bhiksu Dharmakara and established 
the Forty-eight great Vows that surpass conceptual understanding.. . .
(CWS I: 461)
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situation一 its rejection o f absolutism, its recognition of human finitude, its 
acceptance of the role of social-historical-cultural conditions一the closer we 
come to seeing Shinran5s world and the more relevance his words have for 
our situation. Technically, mappd is post-shobo (the time when systematic 
correctness was possible) and post-zobo (the time when at least semblance of 
truth was possible).
In examining the purported reasons for thinking Shin Buddhism does not 
have a developed sense of ethics, we have already looked at Shinran's 
emphasis on the akunin over the zennin. Let us turn now to the second rea・ 
son we mentioned: Shin Buddhism5 s basic anti-authoritarian stance. If  there 
is no external authority, one might wonder, how can there be a basis for m or­
al action? To answer that question we need to consider Shinran?s life as well 
as his thought. Shinran5s banishment from Kyoto put him originally into 
contact with the rural people and outcasts of the Kanto region. Yet, he did not 
leave those people as soon as the decree was revoked. Shinran brought the 
Pure Land teachings to those poor, marginalized peoples by not abandoning 
them, by being one of them, by relinquishing all clerical trappings that might 
suggest he was somehow better than them or more spiritually advanced than 
them. It was not that Shinran gave the people the truth, but rather he embod­
ied the Pure Land Way and people discovered it through his person, just as 
Shinran himself had discovered it in Honen?s person. Shin Buddhism is a 
religion of compassion, not charity. There is no call to help others as a prin­
ciple of action, but instead there is the confrontation and identification with 
suffering, whether one's own or others'. Shin Buddhist ethics is not self-con­
sciously doing good for others, but instead, of being there for others, sharing 
and responding to their suffering as indistinguishable from one's own. If  I 
am a person of shinjin, I feel gratitude not because /  was able to alleviate the 
suffering o f others, but because our common suffering has been alleviated 
through the compassionate working of Amida's Vow.
This brings us to the third common reason we listed for overlooking the 
ethical dimension of Shin Buddhism: that from the Shin Buddhist perspec­
tive I am incapable of being a moral agent. Only Amida can act morally and 
I am merely the vehicle through which that compassion acts. This, however, 
is not a tcdo-nothing" ethics, but instead what I call an ethics that arises from 
"having nothing to do." "To do nothing" means the intended rejection of 
action, a giving-in to the status quo, the kind of posture that can qualify as a 
"sin of omission" as contrasted with a "sin of commission." "To have noth- 
ing to do," on the other hand, is an openness to act. It is not inaction, but pre-
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action. For the compassion of Amida?s Vow to arise in me, I must be open to 
perceiving the suffering of others and identifying it as my suffering. In 
everyday life, we most often show no compassion when we are distracted 
from that basic perception of suffering in the world. We are so busy doing 
things, even planning how to do good things, that we do not have the time 
just to be aware of the suffering and to let Amida5s compassion operate nat­
urally with jinen  in our actions. If  I let myself have nothing to do, however, 
I will find that the power o f Amida?s Vow will work through me. We can see 
that this is an ethics of responsiveness rather than responsibility. Rather than 
being an ethics of hakarai that requires figuring out and evaluating a fist of 
moral principles, it is an ethics of awareness and spontaneity.
In short, we have seen that we can discount all three common reasons for 
thinking that Shinran5s religious philosophy lacks ethics or is even amoral. 
We may now analyze what Shinran said positively about ethics and speculate 
on how it might be as applicable to our postmodern consciousness as it was 
to Shinran's m672pd-consciousness. As suggested in the preceding para­
graph, the key to Shinshu ethics lies in Shinran's understanding of agency. 
So let us examine that more carefully.
Agency is related to the notion of causality: an agent is what causes some­
thing to be done or to happen. Shinran claims that we can understand human 
agency as operating in either of two dimensions. Let us begin with the more 
obvious dimension, the one that defines the domain of everyday life as lived 
by ordinary bonbn 凡夫 like us. We think of ourselves as independent agents: 
we schedule our days; we calculate our long-term goals and set out a path for 
reaching them; we use our knowledge and understanding to help us manage 
and take control of our lives. That type of thinking was paramount in the 
Zeitgeist of the early and middle Heian period. If there was a plague in 
Kyoto, just send Kukai up Daimonji and his fiery thaumaturgy would save 
the lives of the people below. If you wanted to fathom the patterns and struc­
tures of the universe so that you could be a harmonizing force in reality, just 
study and practice the mandalas. If you needed the extraordinary powers 
(siddhi) o f the buddhas and bodhisattvas, just chant the right mantras. If you 
wanted to know the meaning of the text, use the Tendai classification of the 
text to match the meaning to an intended context or audience. Power was 
there to be harnessed and the great sages of the Heian period knew how to do 
it. The early Heian period, like the modem W esfs period of Enlightenment, 
was a time of extraordinary intellectual, spiritual, and cultural optimism. 
Through the personal agency developed via the Holy Path of Sages, the
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material and spiritual could be bridged. I am in control of my actions and, 
therefore, of their karmic results as well. Such was the way of thinking 
before / 网@dconsciousness.
Shinran's 725-consciousness focuses on another side to the karmic 
understanding of agency, however. If karma means our present actions will 
have future results, it is also true that our present actions are the karmic 
results from the past. Individual or personal agency comes to be understood 
as the result一 not the cause一 of karma. That sense of personal autonomy 
and freedom so strongly etched in Heian optimism was undercut by the 
Kamakura realism, a realism that approached fatalism. If everything is con­
ditioned, then my own actions right here and now are conditioned. W hat I 
can do is determined by the confluence of various external processes and fac­
tors making me what I am. But what if those external circumstances have 
through the ages taken such a cumulatively negative turn that the process was 
no longer reversible? What if it became no longer possible to gain back that 
earlier, perhaps more naive, sense of autonomy? Such was the pessimism (or 
was it realism?) that heightened the late Heian and early Kamakura sense of 
mappd.rrhe age of the Holy Path of the Sages was over.
We can see the similarity to the postmodern situation. We thought science 
would find us all the answers. What science did not know, it would eventu­
ally find out. Even Japan5s Meiji leaders thought they could control Japan's 
future. Technology has given us ever more choices and apparent freedoms: 
for vacations we can easily travel anywhere in the world; for entertainment 
we have readily available a variety of media for our immediate selection; we 
can study and choose among a wide variety of financial investments. This is 
comparable to the optimism and sense of self-control of the early Heian peri・ 
od. Yet, our postmodern consciousness moves us beyond that sense o f naive 
freedom. We find that as nations and as individuals, the system is more com­
plex than we can understand. The technologies that were supposed to save us 
(nuclear energy, insecticides and chemical fertilizers for farming, wide­
spread use of antibiotics, the chemical enhancement of foods, and so forth) 
now seem to be technologies that could destroy us. But nobody is in charge; 
no one is personally to blame. Complex social, economic, political, racial, 
gender, nationalistic, and class factors together make us do what we do. Our 
products are not just what we produce; they are also what make us what we 
are. We no longer feel as much a cause for the future as a result from the past. 
The problems are so complex一 and with mass communication we know how 
complex they are一 that as individuals we feel helpless. We no longer expect 
leaders in our society because we no longer believe in the personal sageliness
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of leadership. Postmodernism^ critical theory maintains that personal, free 
agency is an illusion. It is, in the terms of m(7/2/?d-consciousness, simply the 
working of karma.
This analysis allows us to pose the problem of ethics in the following way. 
On one hand, there is the theory that I am an agent in control of my own sit・ 
uation. I am responsible for the consequences of my own actions and I have 
available to me the knowledge of reality that allows me to choose wisely and 
ethically. That is the position of both modernism and the Holy Path of the 
Sages. On the other hand, both m6^ ^-consciousness and postmodern con­
sciousness find that position untenable. From the standpoint of both mappo 
and postmodemity, I am not a free agent at all, but rather the interflux of a set 
of conditions I cannot control. For mtzppd-consciousness that means I am the 
result of past karmic activity. For postmodern consciousness, I am the result 
of external forces and conditions that dictate my position in the world, how I 
see things, and how I react to them. So, even if I try to see reality for what it 
is and respond to it with virtue, that view of reality and that expression of 
virtue are conditioned by the ideologies of which I am a part. There is no 
truth "out there5? to be known or expressed; there is only the pragmatic 
engagement o f people to listen to each other, recognize the difference of per­
spectives and ideologies, all the while working toward common practical 
goals. Anything else is false consciousness.
There remains a problem that such a postmodern consciousness cannot 
resolve, however. Namely, how is it possible to reflect on one's own position 
without false consciousness? Who is it who reflects on my ideologically 
immersed worldview? It cannot be the of the false consciousness, 
because that 'T ' would only see what it has been conditioned to see and 
therefore would conclude that other peoples' consciousness may be false, but 
not mine. Yet, for postmodemity, that is the only T "  there is. There is no 
other agency because there is no really personal agency at all, according to 
its analysis. Some postmodernists have tried to elude this difficulty by plac­
ing a kind of agency in the shared, open dialogue across ideological stances. 
That is, false consciousness can be eliminated only by a shared context of 
conversation, interaction, listening, and responding. That conclusion follows 
from an unexamined and unfounded premise however, namely, that collec­
tively we can be correctives on each o thers false consciousness even though 
we cannot be a corrective on our own.12 Who will listen to, who will be open
12 We may also note in passing that such a postmodern model of communal discourse 
develops paradoxically out of modernism's faith in totality. That is, believing that the 
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to, who will share with, and learn from the opposing viewpoint? How can I 
ever know that my ideological and contextual standpoint is not going to pre­
vent communal and collective engagement? The m^/?d-consciousness fully 
engages that question in its realization that not only am I corrupt and karmi­
cally entangled, but the system as a whole is corrupt and karmically entan­
gled. There is no way out. There is no alternative. Shikata ga nai）3
It is at this point, simultaneously both in Kamakura5 s mappd-conscims- 
ness and our own postmodern consciousness, that Shinran's philosophy 
becomes most relevant. Shinran points us to another dimension of agency 
that was missed by the optimism of both modernism and the Heian period as 
well as by the pessimism of mappo or postmodemity. That dimension is the 
compassion that is as universal and alive as Amitayus, as unhindered and 
bright as Amitabha. In analyzing the role of agency and efficacy in Shinran^ 
ethics, it is important to bring in the importance of Dharmakara^ （Amida's） 
Twenty-second Vow （the so-called genso ekd no gan 還相廻向の願）. If we 
want to approach Shinran's most profound statements about ethics, we need 
to look beyond his discussions of good and evil, which we have already ana­
lyzed, to his idea of gensd, the return from the Pure Land to help other 
beings. It is easy to stress the idea of birth in the Pure Land （ojo 往生）or of 
going to the Pure Land （oso 往相）so much that the importance of genso is 
forgotten. Yet, it is precisely at that point that compassionate engagement 
with others can occur, according to Shinran. In fact, in Shinran's interpreta­
tion （unlike some of the earlier Pure Land thinkers）, djd and genso are insep­
arable parts of the working of Amida's Vow.
One way to state Shinran^ point is that there is an agency outside karmic 
conditionedness and the negative context of mappo. That agency for Shinran
different viewpoints can fruitfully engage each other is more like modernism5s metaphor of 
the blind men and the elephant than the postmodern metaphor of the blind men and the phys­
ically ideal woman, where nothing useful is accomplished by sharing different views. In that 
respect, the discourse is actually a denial of the postmodern situation rather than a solution 
posed within it.
13 Shikata ga nai しかたがない is a colloquial Japanese expression meaning, roughly, 
"there's no alternative" or "what else can I do?" or "I've no choice." Similar to the function 
of those English phrases, Japanese commonly use '"shikata ga nai" as a cop-out, a way of 
shirking responsibility, a hollow excuse for moral indolence. In this paper I play off its literal 
meaning of "[1] do not have something to do." So, I use the Japanese phrase not to imply the 
inactive "doing nothing" but the pre-active "having nothing to do, so. . . When I "have 
nothing to do," it is the opportunity to do something not previously planned. Because there is 
nothing to do, something can be done.
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is, of course, the working (gz 義)of Amida's Vow. By relinquishing all sense 
of self-agency or of my own power (jiriki), a person relinquishes karmic 
conditionedness and its negative impact. As long as I intend to act morally, 
there is no escaping the fact of the conditionedness of that "I." My situation, 
my ideological and social context, my intellectual training, and my personal 
experiences influence what I am. If I give up that T ,"  there is only the work- 
ing of the Vow, the ''other power" {tariki). Yet, that tariki is itself compas・ 
sionate and knows no bounds. So its working not only takes the person of 
shinjin to the Pure Land, but also in its expansive response to suffering, com­
passion returns that person to the world of suffering beings and in that way 
the person is a vehicle for Armda's compassionate agency. That is why 
Shinran could first encounter the Pure Land Way not through philosophical 
analysis or textual scholarship or Tendai practices, but only through his 
encounter with Honen. In turn, Shinran5s followers encountered it in the per­
son of Shinran. What they really encountered was not Shinran5s wisdom or 
compassion. After all, Shinran was a self-proclaimed "slacken" (gutokii). 
No, what they encountered was instead the working of the Vow through 
Shinran. Shinran^ moral and spiritual agency was not his own (jiriki), but 
that of someone or something else (tariki).
In a still deeper sense, however, there is no self-other or ji-ta  bifurcation 
at all. Within the t6just-so ,? (jinen hdni 自然法爾),there is neither Amida nor 
Shinran. That there is an Amida at all is only possible because of the fulfi 
ment of Bodhisattva HOzo's Vows and his Vows are only fulfilled if  there is 
shinjin. That is why Shinran says Amida is a hoben hosshin 方便法身,an 
expedient manifestation of the true reality, the hosshd hosshin 法性法身.The 
hossho hosshin is, like Amitabha?s light, infinite and without discrimination. 
In that deepest sense, there is neither agency on the side of Amida nor on the 
side of Shinran. There is only shinjin itself as jinen hdni. That shinjin, 
Shinran explained in Yuishinshd mon 7, is itself buddha-nature, is itself dhar­
ma-nature, is itself dharma-body.14 Such an explanation is, of course, meta­
physical and abstract. So, the question arises as to what practical meaning it 
might have in daily life. Earlier we noted it is important to see Shinran's 
most difficult passages as not just claims about reality, but also as phenome­
nological descriptions of human experience. So experientially, what does 
this mean for us in our postmodern mappdl
Shinjin is what allows me to be other than myself, where “m yself'' means
14 See full text of passage in footnote 11 above.
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the self that is karmically and ideologically conditioned. When I am not 
myself, there is no j i  of jiriki but only the j i  of jinert. It is not j i  in the sense 
of jibun (自分, u oneself??)5 but j i  in the sense of onozukara (自ら,6<sponta­
neously5 ?). That is, T "  do not act, but action happens of itself in the form of 
the working of Amida5s Vow. In this postmodern context we do not need to 
set a moral agenda, either individual or collective. An "'agenda55 is Latin for 
u something that must be done.55 We need, in fact, the opposite, a sense of 
"having nothing to do, so...55 That is, I should not close myself to action, but 
instead open m yself to responsiveness. I should not make a call to action, but 
instead let the situation call me to respond. I should not try to flee from the 
depressing reality that in the face of all the suffering in the world and in 
myself, I can do nothing. In fleeing from that reality, we only delude our­
selves into thinking the answer is right around the comer if  only we talk 
about it more, share our wisdom, include more voices. We cannot bring har­
mony to the cacophony by adding yet another different voice. Mappd-con- 
sciousness tells us that we can neither understand the dharma nor put it into 
practice. In this age of mappd, we need another alternative; neither theory 
nor praxis can be trusted to work.
By abandoning theory and practice, by leaving ourselves nothing to do, 
karmic results and ideological contexts become no more than reminders that 
I can do nothing. But that does not mean nothing will get done through me. 
If with true, genuine, heartfelt shinjin (shinjin as makoto no kokoro13 *5), we 
can give ourselves over to the sense of nothing to do, compassion will arise 
of itself to relieve us from our personal anguish (oso eko) and to bring us into 
the world as agents of a compassion beyond what I myself can be (genso 
eko). We will see the working of compassion, marvel at it, and feel gratitude 
for its working. Having discarded the self-conscious sense of ethical respon­
sibility, we can manifest moral responsiveness to the suffering of self and 
others.16 An example may explain the difference.
13 The term makoto no kokoro^ ("the genuine heart/mind^^) deeply resonates with 
Japanese culture. It has strong Shinto roots (emphasized by such later kokugaku 国学 thinkers 
as Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長).It is also continuous with classical Chinese ideas about the 
inherent goodness of human nature (which will be manifest if one is genuine). By writing (in 
furiganci) "makoto no kokoro まことのこころ" a s  a reading for shinjin, Shinran significantly
expanded the meaning of shinjin (usually something like ^entrusting heart/mind") beyond the
domain of technical Pure Land terminology. In that way, Shinran Japanized the tradition, per­
haps doing so better than had any of the earlier Japanese Pure Land thinkers.
16 This distinctive form of agency is reflected in Japanese syntax where the passive "it was 
done to/for me" is typically the same as the honorific active "[someone more honorable than
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When waiting alone for my plane in an airport, my usual modus operandi 
has been to buy a newspaper or magazine to pass the time, to "have some­
thing to do" to distract me from all the activity around me. One time, how­
ever, I let myself have nothing to do. I did not simply pass over into a 4tzoned 
out," autistic state of inactivity, but instead opened myself to what was 
happening around me. In that airport I saw a cross-section of humanity rep­
resenting various classes, races, genders, and nationalities. Some were obvi­
ously waiting for arriving passengers; others for the boarding of their own 
planes. Some were joyous, some sad一travel can be a condition for either. 
Some acted like frequent fliers and others as novices. In the midst o f all this 
activity, I saw a woman with a small child, a carriage, and two carry-on bags 
standing on the moving walkway in the middle of the concourse. She looked 
like she might have some problem negotiating everything when the moving 
walkway ended. I felt the difficulty of handling everything safely and I was 
uneasy. I spontaneously got up and walked toward the walkway. I arrived 
about the same time as she was going to get off and I helped her empty car・ 
riage find its way safely off the walkway so she could concentrate on her 
child and carry-ons. She thanked me and I said, T t was nothing?5 It was 
nothing, the kind of nothing that makes spontaneous helpful action possible. 
If I had had an agenda, as in reading a magazine, I would not have seen her 
problem in time to help, i f l  would have seen it at all. Yet,'because I had noth­
ing to do, I saw her difficulty and identified with it. When the problem 
worked itself out naturally, I was grateful for the relief from our hassle.
Consciously trying to help others by figuring out the true ideology or true 
praxis is only another obstruction. Even trying to think through our problems 
by collective conversation and setting a common agenda despite our differ­
ences is still hakarai. It is a hakarai bom of our collective karma and condi­
tionedness by our social and ideological situation. To be compassionate is to 
not be able to distinguish whether the suffering is ours or another's. In the 
Great Ocean of the Primal Vow, the distinction between j i  and ta, the differ­
ence between self and other, disappears into the openness of jinen. How do I 
know this is so? In this postmodern age of mappo, I cannot know. I only 
know what Shinran has taught and I only know shikata ga nai. That special 
sense of shikata ga nai, the openness of pre-action, is the basis o f Namu 
Amida Butsu.
I] did it." That peculiar syntax allows the same phrase to be a rejection of jiriki's activism and 
an affirmation of tariki's activism.
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